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A Tale of Two Revolutions:
A Comparative Case Study of the Rhetoric of
Twenty-First Century Socialist Movements in Cuba and Venezuela
ABSTRACT
Cuba and Venezuela have historically been signaled as the two longest-lasting socialist
revolutions and governments in the Western hemisphere. Much of their revolutionary theory
has been based on the actions taken by the United States towards Latin America as a whole,
as well as towards those two countries specifically. This can be most acutely perceived in the
ways in which the leaders of these revolutions, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, speak about
the United States in relation to their own ideologies. Consequently, simultaneously studying
these policies by the United States, Castro’s speeches, and those by Chávez provide evidence
on how punishment and radicalization are closely related. Specifically, political sanctions have
historically fueled the passion with which the sanctioned regime opposes its rival. Additionally,
the punishment and radicalization on one revolutionary regime has informed the other
revolutionary regime, in that the close ties between Cuba and Venezuela have been crucial to
shaping some of Chávez’s rhetoric as well.

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 11th, 2019, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo explicitly blamed
Havana and Moscow, the capitals of Cuba and Russia respectively, for the massive power outage in
Caracas, Venezuela. He said of Venezuela’s current situation, “When there is no electricity, thank the
marvels of modern Cuban-led engineering. When there’s no water, thank the excellent hydrologists
from Cuba. When there’s no food, thank the Cuban communist overlords.”1 Pompeo further
described Cuba’s relationship with Venezuela specifically as “a match made in hell.”2 Studying the
situation from a perspective focused purely on recent events, the accusation that Cuba may be
involved in the Venezuelan crisis, or even be considered Venezuela’s “communist overlords”, might

David E. Sanger, Anatoly Kurmanaev and Isayen Herrera, “Pompeo Accuses Cuba and Russia of Propping Up
Venezuelan Ruler,” (The New York Times, 2019).
2 Ibid.
1
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seem bordering on conspiracy. However, the two countries have a much deeper connection than
merely their dedication to a socialist ideology and a culinary taste for rice and black beans. Cuba and
Venezuela are the two most well-known instances of established socialist regimes in Latin America
in the twentieth and twenty-first century, consequently dubbing themselves as twenty-first century
socialism itself.
The histories not only of the establishment of these regimes, but also the countries
themselves, are far from identical. Cuba’s socialist project began as more of a revolutionary
movement in the sense that it was not politically sanctioned or democratically elected when Fidel
Castro assumed power in 1959, whereas the project in Venezuela became politicized mainly through
the election of Hugo Chávez Frías forty years later. Additionally, their trajectories since the
ascension to power of both Castro and Chávez (and later on Nicolás Maduro) have not been entirely
the same. However, the two brands of twenty-first century socialism have been mutually
intertwined, based not just on trade agreements and diplomacy but a shared political and
revolutionary ideology in particular, since the end of the twentieth century. As political leaders and
faces of these revolutions, both Castro and Chávez have made no secret of their strong negative
feelings towards the United States and its imperialism, going as far as to refer to the country as “the
empire itself.” As different as each revolution may have been or continues to be, this animosity
towards the United States has long been a trademark to some degree of the rhetoric employed by
these leaders, if not having been present since the beginning of their respective projects. This begs
the question: to what extent have the policies of the United States towards Latin America informed
the socialist projects of Cuba and Venezuela?

5

Figure 1: Logic Pyramid

The United States has a long history of implementing policies, both foreign and economic,
that have both directly and indirectly impacted Latin America. As George Weeks described it, the
relationship of the United States “with Latin America remained based firmly in the concept of
security, and the advancements of U.S. economic development became intertwined with security.”3
This paper will provide a brief overview of the existing literature on the relationship between the
three points of the Logic Pyramid, shown above. A summary will then be provided of United States
interventions in the region, taking the time to outline specific instances in which its policies have
impacted Cuba or Venezuela alone. Basing this argument on dependency theory, the point will be
made that the foreign policies of the U.S. can and historically have influenced certain regimes and
political rhetoric in Latin America.
In order to do this, a closer look at certain speeches by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez will
show how the discourse of each leader evolved over time, in response to actions taken by the United
States. U.S. interventions occurring both before and during the governance of each leader will
establish a connection not only between the historical American legacy of involvement in Latin
America and current regime ideology, but also between ongoing sanctions and the leaders’ speeches
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Gregory Weeks, U.S. and Latin American Relations, (Pearson Longman, 2008), 89.
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at the time. This will demonstrate that political sanctions have the capacity to further radicalize the
governments being sanctioned. A further examination of the triangular relationship shown in Figure
1 will also show the connection between Castro’s socialism and Chávez’s socialism, as well as the
more complex relationship between Castro and the United States. Finally, the implications of this
study on the current political situation in Venezuela and the United States’ role will be outlined,
arguing the need to proceed with caution when imposing sanctions even just on high-level
governmental officials. This policy suggestion will be based on the overarching thesis that political
sanctions and ideological radicalization have a complicated, mutually influential relationship, as
shown by these specific case studies of Cuba and Venezuela.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In his book, Weeks does an efficient job of tracing the present relations between the United
States and countries in Latin America back to the late 19th century, including Cuba and Venezuela. He
analyzes the motivation behind these actions taken by the United States, arguing that oftentimes these
are meant to serve American interests almost exclusively. Furthermore, he pays attention to global
settings that have an undeniable effect on the region, including and particularly the Cold War. He also
studies the relationships between these countries to some extent, describing how certain grievances
were shared across borders and thus cultivating a culture that was dissatisfied with imperialism.
Peter Smith, on the other hand, attributes this rather paternalistic approach by the United
States towards Venezuela, and the region as a whole, to President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy,
which he describes “not as a departure from past practices but as the culmination of trends in U.S.
policy toward the region.”4 Smith focuses more on outlining the policies and historical trajectories of
interventionism by the United States toward Latin America, beginning in the 19th century and
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Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, (New York: Oxford University, 2013), 92.
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continuing until the year of writing, 2013. He critically studies the potential motivations behind,
content of, and impact upon Latin America as a whole of specific policies by the United States through
an admittedly anti-imperialist lens, detailing how certain actions by the American government may
have led to radicalization or worsening of conditions in Latin America. His explanation of the
reasoning and impact of the stance of the United States on regional hegemony, leftist regimes, and
neoliberalism provides important contextualization of the country’s actions, particularly its behavior
towards regimes it opposes or considers dangerous for its own interests, such as Cuba. He further
suggests an almost circular relationship between the policies of the United States against communist
regimes and the radicalization of these regimes.
While both Smith and Weeks effectively provide a general overview of the relationship
between the United States and Latin America through structuralist perspectives, their works do not
particularly touch upon the relationships between the countries in Latin America affected by what
they are studying. Smith does not center his study on Venezuela and Cuba, and consequently does
little in terms of exploring the link between the two from an in-depth perspective. Weeks also frames
his work in a much more regional level, studying the responses of Latin America as a whole. As a
result, neither of these two renowned works on United States interventionism necessarily addresses
specific instances of the United States having a more direct impact upon certain countries of the
region, let alone how these impacts might affect and influence each other.
Furthermore, while there have been individual case studies or works that relate Hugo Chávez
to Fidel Castro in terms of ideology and anti-imperialist rhetoric, there is a shortage in literature that
specifically focuses on the complex relationship between the socialism in Venezuela and Cuba and the
policies of the United States. Javier Corrales and Carlos Romero efficiently examine the mutually
affective relationship between the United States and Venezuela, as well as the impact of VenezuelanCuban relations on that relationship. However, their study still fails to draw a comprehensive
8

connection between the three to study their historical parallels and their implications. Additionally,
few studies if take a comparative approach on not only actions by the leadership but also their specific
rhetoric. An example of this is James Cohrs’s analysis of how Cuba may have helped the socialist
government in Venezuela remain in power. While his paper effectively demonstrates the policy
linkages between the two revolutionary governments, it provides little background on why the two
parties might have an ideological stake in helping each other. It also does not mention the role that
the United States’ policies may have had in both revolutionary projects.
Those that do focus on speech specifically, such as William LeoGrande’s study of U.S. and
Cuban rhetoric and how they inform each other, are concentrated primarily on only one of the two
relationships depicted in the Logic Pyramid in Figure 1. Another example is Antonio Reyes’s book on
the use of language by George Bush, Hugo Chávez, and Fidel Castro. A shortcoming of such a study
is that it mainly considers language as a tool and less as an ever-changing, reflective surface on which
to analyze the relationships upon which it is wielded. While these are informative to understanding
certain dimensions of these relationships, it is crucial to study all three connections—U.S. policies,
and Cuban and Venezuelan rhetoric—in tandem, to grasp their full synergy. This begs the question:
to what extent have the policies of the United States towards Latin America and the projects of
“twenty-first century” socialism in Cuba and Venezuela informed each other?
III. METHODOLOGY
To conduct this study, a comparative historical analysis will be used to address this question,
as it will inspect various characteristics of Cuba and Venezuela’s individual histories, recent socialist
political rhetoric, and mutual relationship, through the lens of both cases having been successfully
established socialist projects. Specifically, John Stuart Mill’s Method of Agreement will be employed
in order to see how, despite varying factors in the pre-revolutionary history of these countries, this
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specific factor of United States interventionism has unified the discourse of the two socialist projects.
Mill’s method posits that if in case studies that see a particular effect there is a single common factor,
then this common factor is the cause of the effect. In this study, the particular effect is the radical
socialist rhetoric of the leftist projects in both case studies of Cuba and Venezuela; and the common
factor is United States policies towards Latin America, specifically U.S. interventions in these two
countries. This perspective is useful for analyzing these two cases because they have shared
characteristics with each other across a range of dimensions wide enough to be comparable, while still
having different executions and implications so as to discuss how differing degrees of importance
conferred to American interventionism might have been addressed through the leaders’ speeches.
Additionally, this paper will employ a historical-structural perspective, which is also used by
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto and, to an extent, Theda Skocpol. This is particularly
important in terms of understanding how the dynamic between the United States and Latin America
is both everchanging and impactful. As Cardoso and Faletto posit, this perspective is helpful as “it
emphasizes not just the structural conditions of social life, but also the historical transformation of
struggles by conflict, social movements, and class structures.”5 Skocpol also fervently defends
structuralism in her study of three particular social revolutions, arguing that this is the most
appropriate framework in which to work, “with special attention devoted to international contexts
and to developments at home and abroad that affect the breakdown of the state organizations of old
regimes and the build-up of new, revolutionary state organizations.”6 Structuralism, especially adjacent
to a historical approach, allows for the possibility of a more dynamic relationship between countries
and regions, and permits the explanation of both the overarching power structures and the smaller,

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, (University of California
Press, 1979), x.
6 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge University Press, 1980), 5.
5
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national-level socialist struggles and movements as mutually informative, rather than one as strictly
causal to the other.
In order to understand the crux of the argument and how actions and policies of the United
States might be able to inform the socialism that grew in Cuba and Venezuela as the independent
variable of this study, it is important to conceptualize these countries’ relationships through the lens
of dependency theory. Dependency theory, as set forth by Cardoso and Faletto, argues that
relationships between what are conceived to be “first world” and “third world” countries are complex
due not just to strictly economic factors, but also the power dynamics between them. It takes a
different perspective from development theory, which suggests that all countries follow a similar
trajectory toward modernity and some countries are merely more underdeveloped than others.
Instead, dependency theory views countries as either core or periphery economies, saying that the
structure of international relations depends on periphery countries being economically dependent
upon core economies. In this way, the authors of this theory argue for a perspective that examines the
ways in which imperialism, United States interventionism, and the histories of Latin American
countries as colonies have contributed to current power structures. According to Cardoso and Faletto,
“there exists among the developed and underdeveloped economies a difference […] of function and
position within the international economic structure of production and distribution.”7 In other words,
political and economic development in each country was not an isolated matter but was instead
occurring in, and being informed by, the network of international relations among other countries as
well.
The United States in particular holds a strong core position in the international economy,
which became even more pronounced by “postwar financial agreements, […] as well as by American
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control of world trade.”8 While this led to many Latin American countries attempting to benefit from
the presence of the United States, especially politicians and economic elites, a situation of dependency
can also be conducive to worsened conditions for the local lower classes. Through the process of
industrialization, the difference in incomes can become greatly exacerbated, further strengthening the
structural heterogeneity of Latin America’s socioeconomic field. Additionally, while United States
businesses held a stake in Latin American countries, the American government was not necessarily
providing aid to help build infrastructure in those nations. As a result of the linkage between income
inequality and the American presence in Latin America, there grew to be a “nationalist and increasingly
anti-U.S. sentiment, fueled by poverty, occupation, and mistreatment.”9 This in turn provides
abundant material to analyze to what extent this involvement of the United States in Cuba and
Venezuela, both specifically and as a core country intervening in the region of peripheral countries,
led to the specific brands of socialism that grew in each of those nations.
Beyond dependency theory, however, a perspective that is crucial to consider is the way in
which these socialist kinds of rhetoric may, in turn, inform the policies by the United States towards
the respective country. While the historical legacy of United States interventionism has given rise to a
certain type of discourse in Latin America, it is also fair to say that this leftist discourse has also
influenced the United States through a relationship based on structural neorealism. This perspective
allows for the study of United States policies towards Cuban and Venezuelan socialism as not static,
but rather a dynamic struggle to protect itself and its regional hegemony from any security concerns
that could arise due to rivaling political ideology. In other words, the ideological and rhetorical
relationship between the United States and Cuba, and between the United States and Venezuela, does

8
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Ibid., 181.
Weeks, 90.
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not flow in a single direction. It is based on mutual reactions to each other’s histories and current
outlooks.
These exact brands of socialism, as aforementioned, will be the dependent variable in this
study. As Skocpol says in her defense of a structuralist perspective, “both the occurrence of the
revolutionary situations in the first place and the nature of the New Regimes that emerged from the
revolutionary conflicts [in her specific case studies] depend fundamentally upon the structures of state
organizations […] as well as their positions in relation to other states abroad.”10 Essentially, both the
national and international contexts may inform the type of social revolution that is both created and
realized, and that the intended outcome and the actual outcome may not necessarily coincide. In other
words, while Marxist theory has been applied to several social revolutions throughout the world—
including the Russian and the Chinese revolutions—the specific rhetoric targeting the United States
as an opponent and source of imperialism is particularly poignant in Cuban and Venezuelan socialism.
It is crucial to distinguish, however, between the current state and governing power in both of
these countries, and the socialist movements themselves. Skocpol makes a distinction between the
faces of such social revolutions, which are often conflated with the movements that they supposedly
represent, and these movements themselves. Keeping in this tradition, it is important in this study to
acknowledge the separation between personalistic leaders like Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro from
the revolutions that they have inherited or helped to see through. Consequently, this study will focus
on the personalistic leaders, Chávez and Castro, as the main faces of the revolutions at the time they
were successfully implemented in their respective countries.
Historical texts and primary documents including speeches and manifestos from these
aforementioned projects will be analyzed to see how far they have been affected by American policies.
Naturally, American policy papers and reports will be analyzed as well, although less so for their
10

Skocpol, 284.
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wording and more for their chronological enumeration of actions taken by the government towards
these two countries. While studying each revolution as a whole would make for a much more in-depth
study of the different facets of revolutionary rhetoric that are impacted by external factors, that project
is extremely ambitious and would require the compilation of thousands of documents, primary and
secondary sources, policy papers, etc. Inevitably, some of the source materials will only exist in their
original Spanish, although the quotes in this study will be manually translated to English for the
reader’s convenience. In terms of time span, the speeches and manifestos being analyzed took place
between the start of the Cuban revolution in 1959, and the end of the Bush presidency in 2007. The
beginning was chosen to study both Cuban and American rhetoric and attitudes towards the beginning
of Fidel Castro’s revolution, the first instances of a leftist threat to the United States since Jacobo
Árbenz in Guatemala. The end of the Bush presidency in 2007 serves as an appropriate end date both
because the time before that spans the formative years of the Venezuelan socialist revolution, and
because the Bush administration’s policies towards Cuba and Venezuela were consistent with previous
presidencies, as opposed to after Obama became president and established new kinds of relationships
with the two leaders. Furthermore, it marks the end of the period in which Fidel Castro was the official
head of state in Cuba.
IV. UNITED STATES INTERVENTIONISM IN LATIN AMERICA
The United States and Latin America have had an ongoing relationship dating back to colonial
times. However, the relevant pieces of history to this study begin primarily at the end of the 19th
century and beginning of the 20th century. One prominent aspect of this relationship is the
interventionist policies that the United States has exercised upon the region. This began as early as
1904 with the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, when President Roosevelt announced
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that sometimes his country would need to take on the role of “international police power.”11 This
Corollary also asserted that the United States “would interfere with [countries in the Caribbean and
Latin America] only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or
unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States.”12
Evidently, then, one of the principal purposes for American involvement in the neighboring region
was to ensure the security of the United States itself.
President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy was a further continuation of this kind of
involvement by the United States in the Latin American region. The United States by then had fortified
its relationship with its neighbors, significantly increasing its direct investments and strengthening its
sphere of influence in the West. The idea behind the Good Neighbor framework was that of
nonintervention, halting the tradition of using direct military force in sovereign nations. This directly
countered the Roosevelt Corollary and supported the independence of individual countries. Instead,
the United States exercised its influence in economic and ideological terms. In 1933, President
Roosevelt mentioned regional trade as “the most important item in our country’s foreign policy,”13
appointing as secretary of state an advocate of liberalization. Additionally, in Panama in 1939 the
American government proposed the need “to eradicate from the Americas the spread of doctrines
that tend to place in jeopardy the common inter-American democratic ideal.”14 This would indirectly
assist the United States in establishing itself as a regional hegemon, especially ideologically.
During the Cold War, the United States was devoted both to stopping the spread of Soviet
influence globally and to preventing the infiltration of Communism into the Western Hemisphere.
The Truman Doctrine proposed by the president was described as a policy “to support free peoples

Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt’s Annual Message to Congress for 1904, (Records of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 1904).
12 Ibid.
13 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Looking Forward, (William Heinemann, 1933), 245.
14 “Resolution VII” in International Conferences of American States, (Panama, 1939), 354-356.
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who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”15 In effect, then,
the United States would reclaim its role as a security hegemon in the region. This continued in a
mutated version of the Good Neighbor policy, as the United States began concerning itself more with
Latin America after the second World War. Throughout this time, the main preoccupation of the
American government was the threat of a potential Communist wave in their southern neighbors.
Further down the line, the United States had two main goals when viewing the country’s
relationship with Latin America: “the 1954 Declaration of Caracas, with its renunciation of Marxism,
and the 1960 Act of Bogotá, with its assault on poverty and underdevelopment.”16 The United States
adopted a perspective heavily based on modernization theory, previously explained as a theory that
posits a uniform trajectory from traditional to modern society that inevitably ought to be followed by
countries. This had a particular economic aspect to it, as trade liberalization and development was
considered to be of utmost importance by this ideology. As a result, leftist movements were seen as
the direct opponent to the concept of modernization. The United States therefore emphasized both
a strictly anti-leftist military support network and a focus on the socioeconomic growth in the region,
as might strengthen trade relations. In the decades to come, this process would manifest itself as
neoliberal reforms being recommended consistently by the United States and global organizations for
Latin America.
At the end of the 1980’s came a set of neoliberal reforms known as the Washington Consensus,
which mainly used Adam Smith’s economic theories to argue for the reduction of state involvement
in the economy, which would disrupt the import-substitution industrialization model on which Latin
America had largely based its economic growth shortly beforehand. Neoliberalism is a crucial aspect
to consider as it has ties both with imperialism and the American-oriented rhetoric in many leftist

15
16

Harry S. Truman, President Truman’s Message to Congress, (Records of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1947).
Smith, 133.
16

movements in Latin America. These new neoliberal policies would provide protections for the private
sector that would eventually significantly help the economy of the United States as well. In Latin
America, banks and investors that would also be drawing benefits from the policies prescribed by the
Washington Consensus reacted positively. Opposition stemmed mainly from the left, including labor
unions, as well as marginalized populations and nationalists. This was mainly due to the fact that the
increase in regional wealth would not be equally distributed, benefitting mainly the private sectors and
foreign investors without lower class locals being able to reap similar rewards. Decades later, the
consequences of neoliberalism in Latin America have been largely mixed, leading to increased foreign
investment but remaining problems of debt and poverty in the region.
A. United States and Cuba
Notably at the beginning of the 1900’s, the United States had a strong influence upon the
island nation of Cuba. The main element was the Platt Amendment from 1903. Under this
Amendment, the United States would have the power to set public debt limits, grant permission to
Cuba before Cuba could enter any treaties, and use the American military to intervene at any moment
“for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the
protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to
Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the
government of Cuba.”17 It essentially made Cuba an American protectorate and served to limit Cuban
autonomy, despite supposedly having been initiated into a postcolonial time period. The Amendment
also mentioned that any acts taken by the United States military in Cuba would be considered “ratified
and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.”18
Additionally, the Amendment established that the leasing of Guantánamo by Cuba to the United
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States would be guaranteed in order to assure Cuban independence, as “to enable the United States to
maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense,
the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval
stations.”19 Through the Platt Amendment, then, the United States not only seemingly constrained the
political and economic power of Cuba as a newly independent nation, but also brought that title into
question precisely through these restrictions.
Because of the legitimization of American military presence in Cuba, the United States was
consequently entitled to make certain interventions when they saw fit. Therefore, the United States
remaining heavily involved in Cuban affairs was not always in order to ensure Cuba’s independence,
but rather was something to ensure the security of American economic interests on the island. This
was not just a matter of the United States being specifically invested in the island; President Wilson
had a deep desire to spread democracy, leading to “U.S. troops [being] sent to more countries, and
occupation was the norm in countries such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. This
combination meant that hegemony and ‘democratic promotion’ were one and the same.”20 This led
Cubans, especially merchants, to resent this influence, to the point that many locals felt that the United
States’ involvement was more unwelcome than seen as a mere security measure. During the decade of
the 1920’s, precisely this perspective, mixed with the continued intervention by the United States, led
to a nationalism after the increased price of sugar after the first World War greatly boosted Cuban
economy.
Aside from the physical presence of the United States, there was also the matter of its influence
in Cuban politics. According to Weeks, “from 1906 until 1934, Cuban politics was characterized by
rapid, often violent changes of government, accompanied by U.S. intervention and, at times, control
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over the country’s finances.”21 This in turn emphasized the dependent relationship between the United
States and Cuba. In 1925, the Cuban presidential elections were won by Gerardo Machado, a candidate
supported both by merchants in Cuba and the United States government for his commitment to
economic development. Machado had a tendency to act harshly upon the working sector of the
country in order to draw investors to the island. Not long after, however, the United States took note
of general Cuban discontent towards Machado, and so they asked him to step aside, leading to him
fleeing the country. The new president was also not widely supported in Cuba, which caused army
officers of lower rank to begin organizing. This ultimately led to the Sergeants’ Revolt, organized by
Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, which resulted in the rise to presidency of civilian Ramón Grau San Martín.
This new president, championing Cuban nationalism, announced his intentions to end the Platt
Amendment. This was a concern to the United States, who had great stakes in the matter of Cuba
restricting American presence and influence on the island. As a result, the United States under the
presidency of Theodore Roosevelt denied diplomatic action, thus illegitimating its new government.
Instead, the United States worked with Batista to oust Grau, which occurred late 1933. The next
president that was inaugurated through Batista led the Roosevelt administration to finally cease the
Platt Amendment.
Afterwards, between 1933 and 1936, the United States eventually decided that “open
interference was no longer part of the diplomatic arsenal.”22 Instead, the American government began
to focus its efforts into preventing the rise of Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Because of
leftist party involvement in eradicating fascism in Latin America during the second World War, they
were able to gain respectability and government positions. The discontentment among more
conservative counterparts throughout the region were eventually able to find “a strong a willing ally
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in their confrontation with the left: the United States.”23 In early 1935, when then-president Carlos
Mendieta suspended constitutional guarantees in Cuba, United States ambassador to Havana Jefferson
Caffery expressed that “‘although [Mendieta’s government] has strengthened its position in the
country by its recent firm attitude, the communists have by no means given up hope and will continue
to be a menace for some time to come.’”24 Evidently, the United States had adopted a policy of
prioritizing anticommunist efforts over democracy in Latin America. As a result, there were a handful
of right-wing dictatorships in the mid-to-late twentieth century in the region that had, directly or
indirectly, received backing and support from the American government. Particularly in Cuba, the
backlash against the political left involved not just political parties but also labor unions. Those
confederations that were not coopted by the government found themselves further marginalized. The
United States also played a role in this, “through the appointment of labor attachés to embassy staffs
and, indirectly, through the anticommunist efforts of the American Federation of Labor.”25
Later, in 1952, Batista himself ascended to power in Cuba after leading a military coup shortly
before the presidential elections. He established dictatorial rule, backed by the support of the United
States. Under his power, “organized crime flourished and lined the pockets of Cuban politicians and
bureaucrats. Corruption was rampant, and the brief Cuban experience with democracy had withered
away.”26 By this point, “much of Latin America had fallen under the sway of long-lived dictatorships
[…] Somewhat conspicuously, these regimes emerged precisely in those countries where the United
States had intervened or intermeddled to the greatest degree.”27 This, along with the economic
involvement of the United States, led to growing resentment among the Cuban middle class, including
one Fidel Castro who was imprisoned after an attack on the army barracks in Moncada in 1953. Castro
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had previously been among Cuban students that traveled to Bogotá, Colombia to join the Colombian
Communists in protesting United States hegemony. Meanwhile in Guatemala, the American invasion
to prevent the rise of Communism began in June of 1954. The return of dictatorship to the country
and the intervention by the United States would have long-lasting consequences, not just on
Guatemalan-American relations but also on those between Cuba and the United States, as well as on
guerrilla warfare itself. Additionally, this had a significant ideological impact upon the revolutionary
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who was in Guatemala at the time. This experience led him to believe that
“real reform […] was possible only in a socialist revolution that excluded the old oligarchic elite and
rejected the façade of ‘democracy’ so heralded in the United States.”28 A couple of years later, Guevara
would find himself in Mexico, where he would meet Castro after the latter was granted general amnesty
by Batista and was thus released. The two of them would begin planning a guerrilla revolution against
Batista’s government. This war was ultimately launched in 1956, to little avail. At this point in history,
Castro was not explicitly socialist, nor was that how he characterized his revolution. In fact, he even
“emphasized the domestic nature of his mission: ‘You can be sure that we have no animosity towards
the United States and the American people.’”29
Throughout the Cold War, the situation escalated as the United States doubled down on its
anticommunist efforts. The refusal by the American government to grant diplomatic recognition to
Castro’s government led to alienation between the two countries, to the point where Cuba began to
seek economic and political support from the Soviet Union instead. This only helped to further
exacerbate the existing conflict between the island nation and the United States. As a response not to
the particular regional dynamic but to the largely bipolar global struggle, the United States “sought to
extend and consolidate its political supremacy throughout the hemisphere. Launching an
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anticommunist crusade, the United States […] encouraged (or compelled) friendly governments to
crush leftist labor movements and to outlaw communist parties; and orchestrated the military
overthrow of elected governments that seemed ‘soft’ on communism.”30 This included the opposition
of Cuban agrarian reform in 1959 and, later on, the trade embargo imposed by President Eisenhower
upon the island nation and the Bay of Pigs invasion carried out in 1961, a failed assassination attempt
by the United States on Fidel Castro.
B. United States and Venezuela
United States involvement in Venezuela began in 1895 with the Olney Doctrine, which
legitimated the United States intervening in the border dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela.
In the very commission organized to handle the concern, there were notably no Venezuelans, and the
result of the dispute was to grant great concessions to Great Britain. Afterwards, however, United
States relations with Venezuela remained stagnant for a significant amount of time, with the former
instead focusing on the World Wars and other pressing concerns in the region. However, once the
United States began to outwardly oppose communist and leftist regimes in the mid-twentieth century,
the country’s government became more involved and invested in regime change in Latin America. As
previously stated, this oftentimes included supporting, both directly and indirectly, right-wing
governments that at times resulted in a blatant dictatorship. For instance, in 1948 the U.S. State
Department granted diplomatic recognition to Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Venezuelan military dictator.
His harsh stance against communism additionally won him the Legion of Merit, a military award by
the U.S. Armed Forces, in 1954. Along with Fulgencio Batista in Cuba and Rafael Trujillo of the
Dominican Republic, Pérez Jiménez enjoyed the support of and close relations with the Eisenhower
Administration.
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In 1958, Pérez Jiménez fled the country after a coup against him, finding exile in the United
States. A mere five months afterwards, Vice President Richard Nixon traveled to Latin America,
stopping in Caracas briefly despite rumors of demonstrations against his visit and United States policy.
In particular, one source of discontent was the fact that the United States had not hidden its support
for the most recent dictator. During his time in Caracas, Nixon’s car had been attacked by protesters,
and he was met with great negative protest. The United States government denounced these
demonstrations as communist agitation, and Nixon concluded that, in light of the origin of the
demonstrations, it would be wise for the United States to not be as closely affiliated with authoritarian
leaders in the region. Nevertheless, “unless they were becoming fragile, unpopular, or inconvenient,
anticommunist dictators could expect continuing support from Washington.”31
Faced with popular unrest throughout Latin America, President Kennedy stated the need to
support democratic governments and thus attempt to prevent revolutionary uprisings. In particular,
centrist parties like Venezuela’s Acción Democrática provided an adequate medium through which to
stave off the rise of the left without aiding more right-wing regimes. Within the countries themselves,
elite classes still worked to prevent social and economic reform, particularly in terms of land and
wealth redistribution. Consequently, despite the centrist government of Rómulo Betancourt, there was
still some degree of social opposition. This resulted in division within his party, particularly as Castro’s
revolution in Cuba gave hope to revolutionaries throughout the entire region that a socialist or
communist governance was possible to attain. Guerrilla bands in Venezuela by the Armed Forces of
National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, FALN) and the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR) further exaggerated this divide.
Finally, towards the end of the twentieth century, the liberal reforms being suggested by
Washington upon Latin America also generated discontent in Venezuela. In 1989, Caracas saw another
31
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demonstration against a structural adjustment program by then-President Carlos Andrés Pérez, also
from Acción Democrática. This was due to the economic policy focus on, and prioritization of, market
expansion and trade liberalization for new economic policies, rather than the welfare of the nation
itself. In this, the United States was implicated due to the government’s attachment and involvement
in the Washington Consensus. This led to a more favorable public opinion regarding the increase of
tariffs, heightened levels of protectionism, and less concessions to outsider oil companies. As such,
the populist rhetoric of Hugo Chávez Frías, by then retired army colonel, was particularly appealing.
His electoral victory in 1998 with 56 percent of the vote clearly conveyed this sentiment. His close
relationship with Fidel Castro and history as a failed military coup leader in 1992, in conjunction with
his policy proposals, only served to further the United States’ opposition to his government.
V. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SOCIALISM
The origin of what is now referred to commonly as “Twenty-First Century Socialism” can be
largely traced back to Fidel Castro’s rise to power in Cuba, although that is certainly not the only
instance of this phenomenon in Latin America. Originally not an avowedly socialist or communist
revolution, Castro’s experiment in Cuba nevertheless came to be known as the greatest example of
socialism by revolution in the Western hemisphere. Nearly half a century later, another socialist
revolution would arise in the nearby South American country of Venezuela, under Hugo Chávez. As
previously mentioned, these two revolutions do not exist, nor have they ever existed, in isolation. The
very interventions by the United States in Latin America enumerated above, particularly in each of
those specific countries, have had a great impact upon the design, implementation, and most
importantly the rhetoric of these two socialist projects. It is therefore crucial to analyze how certain
events and policies may have informed the way in which these two personalistic leaders describe their
revolutionary missions.

24

A. Fidel Castro and the Cuban Left
After the failed attack of 1953 in the Moncada Barracks, Fidel Castro delivered his most
famous speech, “La historia me absolverá”. This speech served to launch him further into the eye of the
public, which “made Castro’s name a household word in Cuba;”32 and would later become the
inspiration for his published revolutionary manifesto. Scholars point out, however, that “there was no
mention of Marx or Lenin, or even the word Socialism. In 1953 Castro was still playing down his
Marxist sympathies. But he was already proposing a radical transformation of society, and rejecting
the Western concept of democracy.”33 Castro would then be imprisoned for a year, later forming a
revolutionary group with his brother Raúl Castro and with Ernesto “Che” Guevara. This group was
instrumental in overthrowing Fulgencio Batista’s government in 1959 after an earlier failed attempt in
1956. Later, on February 16th of that year, Castro became the military and political head of Cuba as
Prime Minister. In the words of Susan Eckstein in her book on the Cuban revolution, “the Cuban
revolution is Fidel’s revolution. Without his charisma modern Cuban history would be different.”34
Castro conducted his revolution largely guided by the speeches and sayings of José Martí, a nineteenthcentury Cuban nationalist and revolutionary figure that to this day is largely revered on the island.
According to Lillian Guerra, Castro’s initial rhetoric was largely based on “Christian discourse and the
promotion of fidelismo as a new cultural religion.”35 Guerra further says that “as early as 1959, Fidel
Castro, Raúl Castro, and Che Guevara pursued the related goals of national sovereignty and economic
independence through speech acts.”36
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Castro is therefore largely credited as a creator of the Latin American “pink tide”, along with
other figures including Hugo Chávez. Much of his language echoed a desire to create a new Cuba
independent of colonial and imperial legacies, entirely self-reliant and newly decolonized. He
continuously expressed a desire to equalize wealth disparity and no longer participate as a branch of
United States hegemony in the region. At this point, he had maintained relatively amiable relations
with the North American country, despite President Eisenhower’s refusal to meet with him during his
visit in April of 1959. His Agrarian Reform Law passed in May 17th of 1959, however, branded him as
“an incipient form of Communism”37 by the United States quite early on in the new revolutionary
regime. This was arguably the beginning of the more significant clashes between Castro’s government
and that of the United States.
Of course, the timing of Castro’s rise to power—early in the Cold War—did nothing to
ingratiate either party towards the other. The United States at the time was pushing for explicit antiCommunism from its allies. Castro, while at the time was avowedly not a Communist, did not do
enough against Cuban Communists, driving an ideological wedge between his government and that
of the United States. This wedge, along with measures taken by the United States to suppress Castro’s
power, resulted in part in closer relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union, enhancing U.S.
opposition of Castro. This division was especially poignant given Cuba’s proximity to the United
States, unlike the U.S.’s relationship with leftist states further away. Further United States involvement
with Cuba throughout the consequent years would prove to have a radicalizing effect on Castro’s
revolutionary discourse, exacerbating the ideological and political divide between the two countries.
It is a widely held position that Washington’s policies against Castro’s Cuba served “to contribute to
its radicalization and to Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union.”38
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A Revolutionary Process
Castro’s Agrarian Reform Law called for the expropriation of holdings greater than a certain
area, to later be redistributed. The compensation for these properties would be based on the value
claims as shown in the property taxes. However, some American properties in Cuba had been taxed
at lower rates due to lowered value claims, resulting in a seemingly unfit rate of compensation for the
expropriation. This was reminiscent to Jacobo Árbenz’s land reform in Guatemala less than a decade
earlier, and the conflicts that arose with the United Fruit Company. The United States, seemingly also
noticing the historical parallels, became concerned that Castro was showing signs of leading a socialist
state. This, in turn, “put into jeopardy the very stability of the hemisphere; it posed a direct challenge
to U.S. hegemony, and its destruction became an obsession.”39 Despite Castro’s insistences that the
revolution was “neither capitalist nor communist,”40 the United States nevertheless perceived this
regime as a potential threat.
The first significant sign of unrest between the two nations came in October 21st, 1959, when
two planes from the United States dropped thousands of leaflets over Havana, Cuba, leading to chaos
that resulted in two deaths and dozens wounded. Pedro Luis Díaz Lanz, a former Cuban air force
chief, came to admit partial responsibility later on. In a speech delivered not a week later on October
27th, Castro stated, “How is it possible that, in exchange for a base in Cuban territory for the greater
security of the American people, [Cuba] should be subjected to attacks from war criminals—attacks
which come from bases on American territory?”41 Here, he clearly referenced both the October 21st
incident as well as the Platt Amendment and its consequent continued leasing by Cuba of Guantánamo
Bay. He characterized this event as “both aggression from foreign territory and domestic treason,”42
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He further took this as an attack specifically on the Cuban revolution when he claimed that these “war
criminals” “want to force the Cuban people to renounce their magnificent revolutionary process and
its aspirations of bringing justice to Cuba. […] This is simply a case in which a revolutionary process
is damaging powerful interests which refuse to accept it peacefully.”43 While this attack had clearly
increased Castro’s defensiveness against the United States and acts of foreign aggression, at this point
he still maintained that the revolution has no avowed ideological characteristic, and that the United
States accusing the Castro government of being communist was merely them “seiz[ing] upon the same
pretext they have been using for 50 years.”44
Cuba: America’s Colony
By his speech at the United States General Assembly on September 26th, 1960, Castro was
openly referring to Cuba as “a virtual colony of the United States.”45 He dated this idea back to the
end of the nineteenth century, stating that “in the opinion of John Adams, […] Cuba was a fruit, a
ripe apple on the Spanish tree ready to fall into the hands of the United States.”46 Here, Castro
expressed a clear, deeply-embedded resentment towards the United States’ treatment of the island. He
drew upon more recent United States actions against Cuba, including the suspension of Cuba’s sugar
quota on July 6th and the trade embargo from August 28th. He also mentioned the Platt Amendment
as part of the “recolonization of [his] country,”47 arguing that “the legislative body of a foreign country
imposed on [Cuba], by force, its right to intervene and its right to lease bases or naval stations.”48 The
reference to intervention, of course, not only speaks to the literal content of the Platt Amendment,
but in addition invokes the broader history of United States interventions upon the region. This right
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of intervention, coupled with the concessions of many different types to the United States, according
to Castro “transformed Cuba from a Spanish colony into a U.S. colony.”49
Castro further attacked this idea of concessions to the United States, dating back to Fulgencio
Batista’s regime in Cuba. He eventually concluded that a revolutionary government had no other
alternative but to modify its policies to suit the people, not the companies. He contested the idea that
the American and other foreign monopolies suffered after the ending of Cuba’s concessions towards
them, arguing that “Cuba was the injured party […] because Batista’s government was maintained in
power with the assistance of the U.S. government,”50 which included military weapons and training.
His diatribe against foreign monopolies in Cuba was extensive during this speech, recognizing the
Agrarian Reform Law and the end of concessions as the “first conflict with the U.S. monopolies.”51
This clash between the interests of the monopolies and the interests of the Cuban government,
according to Castro, “was more than the U.S. government, that is, the representative of the U.S.
monopolies, could tolerate. Then a new stage began in the harassment of our revolution.”52
Before then, he added, “at a time when the U.S. press and the international news agencies […]
described Cuba as a communist government, a ‘red menace’ 90 miles from the United States, the
revolutionary government had not yet had the opportunity of establishing diplomatic or commercial
relations with the Soviet Union.”53 In other words, by the time the United States had branded the
Castro government as communist and, consequently, in line with the Soviet Union, that was not yet
true, regardless of whether that was Castro’s intention at the time. He continued by listing the different
acts of aggression that he perceived the United States to have conducted against Cuba, including
cutting Cuba’s sugar quota and aiming to “deprive [Cuba] of the resources it needed for development
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and to reduce [Cuba] to impotence in order to obtain a political objective.”54 He then expressed his
confusion at the Soviet Union being condemned for actions in Cuba, rather than the United States,
despite the fact that Cuba “[had] not been attacked by the Soviet Union. [They had] not been the
victims of aggression by the Soviet Union. No Soviet aircraft had flown over [their] territory.”55
Partiality towards the Soviet Union is evident, then, in these comments. This was only exacerbated in
January of 1961 when the Eisenhower Administration severed diplomatic relations entirely between
Cuba and the U.S.
Imperialist Interventions
Castro’s rhetoric became more pointedly anti-imperialist and anti-American after the bombing
raids on Cuban air fields in April 1961. At the burial ceremony for the victims on April 16th, the day
after the fact, Castro argued that the Cuban people were “fully entitled to consider the imperialist
attack that took place [the day before] as a doubly criminal, doubly underhanded, doubly treacherous
and thousand-times more cowardly act.”56 While the circumstances in which he was speaking certainly
affected his tone and word choice, the words “imperialist” and “criminal” appear several times
throughout his speech, in reference to the United States. Additionally, in this speech alone he referred
to his government in Cuba as a “socialist revolution” in at least three distinct occasions, indicating a
radicalized shift in his ideology.
After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion began a few days later, on April 17th, 1961, Castro led a
massive May Day rally in Havana on May 1st. The invasion, which was carried out by CIA and Cuban
exiles living in the United States, Castro stated was based on a “false and hypocritical ideal that the
Yankees inculcated in their mercenaries, as if they were parrots repeating the word ‘ideal.’”57 Here he
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accused the United States of essentially brainwashing those sent into the invasion against Castro’s
regime. He later referred to them as “promoting the policy of isolating Cuba, […] complying with
imperialism’s orders and breaking relations with a Latin American country under attack by
imperialism, [and] […] miserable traitors to the interests and feelings of the Americas.”58 Additionally,
this policy of isolation he credited to the United States State Department. While he separately attacked
imperialism and the United States, this speech makes it clear that he largely began conflating the two
by this point, if not earlier.
In January of the following year, 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS) decided to
expel Cuba during their meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay. Additionally, in early February of that
year President Kennedy announced a complete blockade of Cuba. These two occurrences were
referenced in Castro’s “Second Declaration of Havana” speech on February 4th. He first mentioned
José Martí, the Cuban nationalist, signaling him as having referred to imperialism as such as early as
1895. He continued by enumerating the various actions of aggression that the United States had
enacted upon Cuba, adding that “the intervention of the U.S. government in the internal politics of
the countries of Latin America has become increasingly open and unbridled.”59 He also made a
reference to the OAS occurrence, showing his distrust of the organization by stating that “the OAS
was revealed for what it really is—a Yankee ministry of colonies, a military alliance, an apparatus of
repression against the liberation movement of the Latin American peoples.”60 He further signaled the
responsibility of Cuba’s ousting from the organization as belonging to the OAS delegations by saying
that “they know that the U.S. government went there not only to establish the basis for aggression
against Cuba, but the basis for intervention against the people’s liberation movements in any Latin
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American nation.”61 In describing the differences between the United States and Cuba, he mentioned
that while Cuba stood for national sovereignty and socialism, the United States stood for capitalism
and intervention.62 He began to see, and speak of, United States imperialism and intervention as
synonymous with United States foreign policy objectives.
A Socialist and Communist Revolution
Castro spoke again at the founding meeting of the Cuban Communist Party on October 3rd,
1965. Strikingly, he referred to Cuba as “our socialist society, our communist society,”63 openly using
the communist label in regard to the revolution. He additionally spoke of the Communist Party as
“[their] party,”64 further establishing the characteristic of his rule. Castro defended his logic by arguing
that “when the imperialists are surrounding [Cuba], training mercenaries and organizing terrorist
attacks in the most shameless manner, […] when the imperialists threaten to intervene in any country
in Latin America or in the world, we do not live under normal conditions.”65 Here, Castro indirectly
pointed to the interventions by the “imperialists”, referring clearly to the United States, as responsible
for the drastic rebranding of the revolution. Two years later, when speaking on the Latin American
revolution on August 10th, 1967, he said that the United States “have been systematically opposed to
all the concepts of the revolution; to the most pure and sincere revolutionary attitudes of [the Cuban]
people; to [their] concepts of socialism, of communism, of everything.”66
Additionally, two months later when Che was killed, something in Castro shifted. Leycester
Coltman, who studied several biographies of Castro, describes Castro’s reaction to Che’s execution in
Bolivia by government agents as his first truly emotive reaction to a close death. According to
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Coltman’s book, after that event Castro “began to hanker for a more stable and comfortable
relationship with the Soviet Union. […] Perhaps Guevara’s failure did show that the road to worldwide
revolution would be longer than he had hoped. He began to feel, and to express, more gratitude for
the Soviet aid which he had previously accepted as no more than his due.”67 Castro referenced once
again the United States’ blockade on Cuba and the leasing of Guantánamo Bay through the Platt
Amendment in his address towards the United Nations General Assembly on October 12th, 1979, on
behalf of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries. He called out the blockade specifically, as well as
other acts of aggression by the United States towards Cuba, as “a flagrant violation of the UN charter
and the principles of international law, and a threat to world peace.”68
Interestingly, in his speech during the inauguration of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela
on February 3rd, 1999, Castro claimed that the socialist and communist ideology had always been a
backbone of his revolution. He commented that after the blockade and the aggression by the United
States, “the Soviets felt great sympathy for Cuba and great admiration for [their] revolution,”69 as
shown by the aid that the Soviet Union gave to Cuba after the American trade embargo was placed
upon the island. In the absence of economic support from the United States, “there was another
powerful pole and so [Cuba] anchored [them]selves to that pole, which had come out of a great social
revolution.”70 He later explained that Cuba “exported [their] sugar to the Soviet Union and [they]
received oil, raw materials, food and many things.”71 As can be understood from these comments, the
lack of cooperation from the United States to Cuba was a factor in pushing them to collaborating with
the Soviet Union. However, he added, by then “[they] had already read almost a whole library of the
works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and other theoreticians. [They] were convinced Marxists and
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socialists.”72 Still, his comments from speeches in the early stages of the revolution vacillated between
ideologies, being predominantly anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist over anything else.
Nevertheless, the increased radicalization of the Cuban revolution may have been so gradual
and spanned over such a long period that the shift may not have seemed significant. He did concede
later that, while he could not understand why the revolution’s political thought had not been deduced
since the time of the Moncada attacks even though the revolution by then already “contained the
foundation of a socialist program”, he and his fellow revolutionaries “were convinced the time was
not yet ripe.”73 He also admitted that the “angry and arrogant opposition of the United States […] had
a great influence in [Cuba], so it made itself felt and the [revolutionary] process became increasingly
radicalized with each blow and each aggression [they] suffered.”74 Evidently, regardless of whether the
socialist or communist ideologies were guiding principles for the Cuban revolution from the very
beginning, its tumultuous relationship with the United States served to in some ways radicalize it to
the point where it is now.
B. Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan Left
Hugo Chávez is signaled as one of the causes for the reemergence of “‘neopopulism,’ […]
where newly elected presidents […] blamed capitalism and the United States for his country’s
economic woes and income inequality.”75 His rise to political power in Venezuela polarized views of
him, depicting him as either “a redeemer of not just Venezuela’s but Latin America’s long-suffering
poor” or “a populist authoritarian intent on ending the region’s longest uninterrupted democracy.”76
He began his life in the political spotlight in 1992, after a failed coup attempt against then-president
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Carlos Andrés Pérez. After being imprisoned for two years, the new Venezuelan president Rafael
Caldera pardoned him, along with other members of the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200, or
MBR-200. He ran in the 1998 elections, winning with 56% of the vote. At the very beginning of his
rule, his main position was as an alternative to the previous Punto Fijo democratic system that had
ultimately broken down. His discourse focused not only nationalist figures, but also “elements from
panindigenous and Afro-Venezuelan ideologies, socialism, neofascist thought, and liberationist
Catholicism, as well as evangelical Protestantism.”77
His speeches tended to focus less against the United States by name, and more against
imperialism and oligarchy as a whole. During his speech at the 60th General Assembly of the United
Nations, Chávez spoke in more general terms about the political and economic crises of Latin
America. He merely stated that “[they] are driving in Venezuela, too, a new economic model.”78 He
also described as his main goal “the justice for the peoples of the Third World.”79 In terms of what
the revolution stands against, he only mentioned “a crisis without precedents in all our history, a moral
crisis, an economic crisis, a political crisis, a social crisis; that has taken [Latin America] to dangerous
extremes, to explosive forces that have been concentrating in the last decades.”80 During the early days
of the Bush administration and even before, the Venezuelan president had been one of the voices
actively denouncing neoliberalism and the globalized economy. In the next ten years, his government
“became progressively more radicalized on the back of rising oil export revenues and as it […]
insulated itself from domestic and international pressures from opponents.”81
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Though his rhetoric began closely linked to that of Fidel Castro in Cuba, both in likeness and
praise of the older leader, Chávez soon began to vilify the United States consistently, referring to the
American president in derogatory terms and condemning the actions of the U.S. One study of U.S.Venezuelan relations went as far as to say that their relationship “transformed U.S.-Latin American
relations like no other factor had since perhaps the civil wars in Central America in the 1980s.”82 The
same study described Chávez’s later rhetoric as “reminiscent of the radical left during the Cold War
or of anti-imperialists after the late 1880s.”83
The New Face of Imperialism
Chávez was much clearer in his objectives in his speech from May 16th, 2004, where he
highlighted the need to discuss the ideology of imperialism, a “word [that] was even being removed
from our lexicon.”84 He mentioned one type imperialism, describing it as “the classic interventionist
imperialism that invaded territory, that overthrew governments, that generated world wars.”85
However, this he distinguished from a new type of imperialism, “a less bad empire, that supposedly
no longer needed territorial invasions, but only the penetration of markets through neoliberalism.”86
This kind of imperialism, clearly referencing the neoliberal policies recommended by the Washington
Consensus of 1989, was predicted by him to be “like the great world police, the great universal father,
tough but with a human face.”87 He further assigned a negative character to this neoliberalism by
calling it “the mask behind which hid for almost two decades the old and perverse capitalism, the
mask behind which hid for almost 20 years the old, perverse and murderous imperialism that has
caused so much damage to the peoples of the Third World during 500 years, but is the same old
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imperialism.”88 A product of his time, Chávez did not attack the same villain as Castro did during the
early years of the Cuban revolution; rather, his speech fought against the supposed evolution of
imperialism that emerged towards the end of the twentieth century. Towards the end of this speech,
Chávez returned to the topic of imperialism in itself, emphasizing that the Bolivarian Revolution was
in its anti-imperialist phases. He stated that previously, imperialism had never been singled out as the
enemy of the revolution, but that this revolution “after having passed through several stages, has
entered the anti-imperialist stage, this is an anti-imperialist revolution and that fills it with a special
content that forces us to clear thought and to action not just in Venezuela but in the whole world.”89
Chávez also specifically attacked the Free Trade Area of the Americas proposal that had been
discussed only six months prior, seeing it as another attempt at pursuing neoliberal politics in Latin
America. When negotiations for neoliberalism fail, he said, “then that old imperialism […] finished
taking off the mask and simply shows us once again its bloody fangs and its bloodthirsty claws.”90
Later in the same speech, he characterized it as “murderer, invader […] invading peoples,
overthrowing governments and running over the dignity of millions of human beings on this planet.”91
In referring to imperialism and neoliberalism as a violent creature with a mask, Chávez alluded to the
history of policies and wars aiming for the concentration of capital by certain entities. However, he
refrained from significantly pointing out the United States as the perpetrator yet. He briefly mentions
the attempted coup in Venezuela from April 11th, 2002, saying that “the whole world knows that this
coup occurred and could occur only thanks to the North American support, to the support of the
North American imperialism.”92 Still, beyond these accusations of North American involvement in
the coup, there is no more personal attack.
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“Bushism” versus Socialism
During his speech not two weeks later at the conference La Condición Humana y las Naciones del
Sur [The Human Condition and the Nations of the South], Chávez’s rhetoric began a slight shift. He
referenced a historical moment in which an assassination attempt was aimed at Simón Bolívar, saying
that “it is not very clear, it was never very clear what was the role that the United States Embassy in
Bogotá played in that occurrence in the year [18]28 when they almost killed Bolívar in an assault.”93
The accusatory tone in which he shared that historical anecdote already pointed a finger against the
United States in his speech. He later linked imperialism with the United States explicitly, saying that
“from the United States surge some declarations that constitute another hit towards the Venezuelan
people, and a threat besides that […] And this is part of that battle that began in Venezuela several
years ago, for the essence and the human condition against the inhumanity and the savagery […]
against the imperialist pretention of imposing upon us the neoliberal model and the so-called
bourgeoise democracy.”94
Here, he identified the United States as attempting to impose a certain kind of democracy
upon Latin American nations, later naming Chile, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala as
examples. He later repeated his accusation that the United States had been involved in the April 2002
coup against him, saying that “the CIA was preparing the Allende formula against Venezuela,”95 a
clear reference to the United States’ staged coup against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. He
proceeded to call the American government “a cruel, inhumane, imperialist government” that had
entered a new phase of imperialism beyond those listed by Lenin: “bushism”, so named by Chávez
after the then-president of the United States.96
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At the World Social Forum on January 30th, 2005, Chávez stated that since entering the military
academy in Venezuela, he “began to read Mao [Ze Dong], the military writings, the philosophical
writings, the political theses, the red book.”97 Here, he communicated that even before the attempted
coup of 1992 he had been studying communist thought. He again cited a leftist philosopher when he
reflected upon “that expression by Leon Trotsky, when he said that every revolution needs the whip
of the counterrevolution.”98 He added that in the case of Venezuela, it was “the Yankees [that] came
at [them] with whips: economic sabotage, media sabotage, social sabotage, terrorism, bombs, violence,
blood and death, coup, institutional manipulation international pressure.”99 This counterrevolution,
which he attributed to capitalism and imperialism, Chávez stated “must be transcended by the path of
socialism, that path is how the capitalist model must be transcended, the true socialism.”100
“Mr. Danger”
On June 20th, 2005, Chávez gave a speech on the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
(ALBA), where he began by saying that “the United States of North America was born with an
imperialist sign, like that, with a birthmark. Thomas Jefferson said it, one of the founders, it is written,
proposed the plan of imperialism from the very birth of that state, when he said: ‘Now we must
swallow one by one the republics that are being birthed in this continent.’”101 Despite the clear
exaggeration, his feelings towards the brand of imperialism he attributed to the United States become
extremely obvious throughout this particular speech. ALBA, by design, was meant to be an initiative
“designed to weaken the thrust of U.S.-sponsored neoliberalism.”102 Additionally, he once again
mentioned the attempted coup in Venezuela, referring to it as having been “driven by various fronts,
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one of them the oil one, after the military coup came the oil coup, an operation conceived in
Washington,”103 referencing the oil lockout and strikes that began December of 2002. Besides the
effects of imperialism in his home country, however, Chávez also mentioned “the International
Monetary Fund, mechanism to dominate governments and peoples; the World Bank […] [as]
mechanisms of imperialism.”104 Evidently, he began making connections not just between Venezuelan
higher classes potentially involved in the 2002 coup with the United States, but also between the
United States and international organisms.
Most strikingly, however, this speech marked the beginning of the more personal attacks
against the United States. While in the previous phase of his remarks he had gone as far as to label a
new kind of imperialist stage as “bushism”, he directly attacked the United States president in this
speech. At one point he referenced President Bush by the nickname “Mr. Danger.”105 This, however,
was not the only instance in which Chávez called him by that epithet. During his speech months later
on August 13th, he again called President Bush and his administration “Mr. Danger and his ‘dangeritos’.”
Here, he was accusing them of being “the destabilizers, they are the ones who have destabilized this
continent, they are the ones who have massacred entire peoples.”106 He proceeded to explain the
hypocrisy of imperialism, further emphasizing his enmity towards it. While his personal ideology may
not have shifted significantly so far, the manner in which he spoke about the United States and its
president are indicative of the radicalization of his thought.
Chávez never missed an opportunity to condemn imperialism or highlight Washington’s role
in promoting neoliberalism. In his speech at the 60th General Assembly of the United Nations on
September 15th, 2005, he signals neoliberalism as “the fundamental cause of the great evils and the
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great tragedies that our peoples endure: the neoliberal capitalism, what the Washington Consensus has
generated is greater degree of misery, of inequality and an infinite tragedy to the peoples of this
continent.”107 Later on in the same speech, he added that “the only country where a person can have
the luxury of asking for the magnicide of a Chief of State is the United States, as happened recently
with a reverend named Pat Robertson, very good friend of the White House.”108 In this case, Chávez
is referring to television evangelist Pat Robertson, who commented on August 22nd of that year that
the United States should assassinate Chávez. While Chávez’s comment referenced Robertson
individually, the sentence implicitly invokes the history of the United States with interventions in
which presidents or other chiefs of state have been deposed or assassinated. This, in turn,
demonstrates that Chávez’s rather inflammatory rhetoric regarding the United States was based, at
least to some extent, on the country’s interventionist legacy.
Freedom from “El Diablo’s” Hegemony
Earlier in August of 2005, Venezuela had broken ties with the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) due to accusations that the DEA was spying on the Venezuelan
government. On September 17th, Chávez proclaimed that the allegations that Venezuela was not
collaborating against drug trafficking were misleading. Rather, he said, they “had to break the
agreement with the DEA, not because [they] wanted to but because [they] discovered a few months
ago that the DEA was conducting espionage in Venezuela; that the DEA was conducting illegal
operations in Venezuela, […] what country could allow that?”109 In this case, Chávez is not attacking
the U.S. government itself, but rather the idea that Venezuela might not have been able to exercise its
sovereignty against a U.S. national entity committing crimes on its soil. This idea of external
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domination was further noted in his speech during the celebration of the seventh anniversary of the
Revolutionary Bolivarian Government, when he said that, previously, Venezuela had been “dominated
by transnational interests. Venezuela was, until seven years ago, a colony dominated by the interests
of North American imperialism.”110 Curiously enough, this sentence not only clearly communicated
the resentment of previous foreign domination over Venezuela, but also indirectly referenced Castro’s
speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September of 1960, in which Castro calls Cuba an
American colony.
Almost exactly forty-six years after Castro’s speech at the United Nations, Chávez delivered a
speech before the same audience in which he, in no uncertain terms, condemned the United States
actions towards Venezuela. He referenced Noam Chomsky, whom he called “one of the most
prestigious intellectuals of this America and of the world”, in saying that the greatest threat to the
stability of the world was “the hegemonic pretention of North American imperialism, that puts in risk
the very survival of the human species.”111 He later mentioned President Bush’s speech the day before,
describing how the U.S. president, “who [he calls] ‘El Diablo’ [‘The Devil’] came here talking like the
owner of the world.”112 He continued by saying that “as the spokesperson of imperialism, [President
Bush] came to give his recipes to try and maintain the actual scheme of domination, of exploitation,
and of pillaging of the peoples of the world.”113 He returned to the idea of American hegemony by
saying that “the difference is that the government of this country, of the United States, does not want
peace; it wants to impose on us its model of exploitation and of pillaging and its hegemony through
wars.”114 This speech is clearly the most abrasive towards the United States, which he famously began
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to call “el imperio mismo [the Empire itself].” Nevertheless, his tone regarding what he called American
imperialism and the United States’ hegemony in the region soured and became provocative rather
early on during the Bolivarian Revolution, only to continue to escalate to almost comical proportions.
VI. A COMPLICATED LOVE TRIANGLE
In the above section, it is evident that the shifts in rhetoric of both Fidel Castro and Hugo
Chávez become more leftist and more specifically anti-United States over time, respectively. Castro’s
speeches morph from anti-colonial and anti-imperialist to adopting socialist and communist
characteristics, reflecting the ideological evolution of the revolution itself. Chávez, meanwhile, shifts
from general socialism and anti-imperialism to the rather pointed vilification of the United States as
the sole global empire. Once the speeches are aligned chronologically and compared to key events and
changes in United States policy towards those specific countries (see the timeline in Appendix A),
there are clear instances in which an action taken by the United States is not only directly referenced
in a revolutionary speech, but it in fact changes the tone of the leader delivering it. This is in accordance
with the Logic Pyramid displayed in Figure 1.
However, seldom are policy implications as simple as two one-directional lines—and this
triangular relationship is no exception. There are two key connections not shown in Figure 1 that have
a significant impact upon one or more of the angles of the Logic Pyramid. In Figure 2 below, the sides
that were shown in the first pyramid are shown as dotted, drawing attention to the other relationships
that have not yet been discussed. The first of these relationships is that between the U.S. policies and
imperialism, and Castro’s socialism. While that side of the pyramid existed in Figure 1, the arrow
pointed from American policies down to the Cuban ideology. In Figure 2, the solid arrow points the
opposite direction, indicating that Castro’s socialism not only was informed by U.S. policies, but also
to some degree informed the policies themselves. The second relationship to be discussed is the solid
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Figure 2: Logic Pyramid - Revised

arrow between Castro’s socialism and Chávez’s socialism. Despite the near half century time jump
between the beginning of the two revolutions, the Bolivarian Revolution is inextricably linked to the
Cuban one both in practical assistance and ideology.
A. Fidel Castro and the United States
In his article on the break in relations between U.S. and Cuba, William LeoGrande argues that
the emotional responses of American policymakers regarding Castro’s rhetoric led them to produce
harsher policies against Cuba. According to a U.S. Congressional Research Service report updated in
June of 2006, “since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the
island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions.”115 The report additionally noted that
though the key goal towards Cuba was “to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the
island,”116 there were disagreements on how to achieve this. The option that was seemingly followed
was “maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted.”117 In other words, until
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Cuban policies aligned with the objectives of the United States, sanctions and different kinds of forces
would be pushed on the island.
Fidel Castro himself noted on several occasions that his rhetoric, even before becoming
overtly socialist or communist, was causing unfavorable tensions between the two countries. In his
speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September of 1960, he stated that “the interests
adversely affected by the Cuban revolution […] owned the natural wealth and resources of the majority
of the peoples of the world. So the Cuban revolution had to be punished. Punitive actions of every
type—including the destruction of those insolent Cubans—had to be carried out against the
revolutionary government.”118 Here, he was referring to the aerial attacks, the explosion of La Coubre,
and other such actions that either he suspected or were confirmed to have been carried out by the
CIA.
Two years later, during his “Second Declaration of Havana” in February of 1962, he bluntly
stated that “Cuba hurts the imperialists in a special way. What is hidden behind the Yankees’ hatred
of the Cuban revolution? […] What unites them and agitates them is fear. What explains it is fear. Not
fear of the Cuban revolution but fear of the Latin American revolution.”119 He directly pointed out
the fact that, while a nearby island nation having a successful socialist revolution in itself would not
negatively impact the United States, the possibility that other nearby Latin American nations might be
emboldened by this kind of revolution would not only affect United States industries based in those
countries but also supply the Soviet Union, at the time their Cold War adversary, with ideological
allies.
Interestingly, the previously mentioned policy report did single out a turning point in relations
between the United States and Cuba specifically. It stated that “in the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations
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deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and move
his country toward close relations with the Soviet Union.”120 This sentence has various implications
for this study. On the one hand, several of Castro’s comments in speeches cited in earlier sections of
this study indicated that closer relations with the Soviet Union had been primarily due to the economic
isolation Cuba had begun to suffer at the hands of the United States. This report stating that
deteriorating U.S.-Cuban relations were due to closer relations with the Soviet Union suggests a
circular logic narrative heavily dependent on perspective, similar to that suggested by Peter Smith. On
the other hand, it was not until the mid-1960’s that Castro began consistently describing his
government as communist, indicating that the U.S. characterization of the revolution as “a repressive
communist dictatorship” might have been preempted, if not slightly exaggerated.
During President Chávez’s inauguration in 1999, Castro added that because Cuba was the only
revolutionary socialist state before the Venezuelan election, “all the propaganda, all the mass media in
the world [were] used by the United States in the ideological and political warfare against [the Cuban]
revolutionary process, in the same way that it uses its immense power in all fields, including its
economic power, and its international political influence in the economic warfare against Cuba.”121 By
this Castro meant the Cuban Democracy Act, passed in October of 1992 by the United States
Congress. This policy meant to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by using a twopronged strategy of sanctions and humanitarian support. The United States provided support to the
Cuban population, including “U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under
the terms of the CDA, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored
radio and television broadcasting to Cuba.”122 An important practical impact, however, was an attempt
to extend the economic blockade against Cuba to other countries, further isolating the island.
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Combining the reasoning of this study’s earlier section on Castro’s increasingly leftist rhetoric
informed by United States policies with this section leaves one with the impression that to see either
side as solely the cause or solely the effect would be incorrect. While it may be true that the historical
legacy of the United States as an intervening imperialist force informed much of Castro’s initial
rhetoric, this rhetoric in turn also increased the hostility with which the United States treated Cuba.
This hostility was then met with radicalized speech, which made the United States more hostile—and
this cycle has essentially been repeated ad infinitum. The significance of this fact is that the other branch
of thought outlined by the policy report, calling for “a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations,”123
had not been applied between the beginning of the Cuban revolution and 2007, leaving the question
open as to whether that may have served to de-escalate conflict during that time.
B. Fidel Castro and the Venezuelan Left
The rhetorical and practical ties between the leftist governments in Cuba and Venezuela are
arguably the most prominent relationship of all the ones shown in Figure 2. Hugo Chávez and Fidel
Castro over time fostered a strong fraternal relationship, which “has provided the foundation for a
productive exchange between their countries that has expanded beyond their borders to the farthest
corners of the continent.”124 According to an analysis of the relationship between the two leaders,
“their relationship seems to be anchored in historical and political grounds: two major Latin American
social transformation processes taking place in geographical proximity, sharing domestic and regional
objectives, and encountering similarly motivated opponents were destined to develop close ties.”125
The Cuban and Bolivarian revolutions have been closely linked in ideology since before the Bolivarian
revolution was even institutionalized. Two years after his release from prison for the attempted coup
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in 1992, Chávez delivered a speech in Havana where he made several references to his reverence and
admiration for Castro’s socialism. He commented that, during his time in prison, he “read, in the first
place, in the jail in Yare, that flaring defense, that flaring word of [Castro’s] in ‘History will absolve
me,’ […] and having compared, and, within so many comparisons of so many ideas with 40 years
almost of difference between one and the other, making several conclusions, […] That [they] re-read,
[they] read in the prison, and it was for [them] sustenance for prisoners, and it was for [them], and
continues to be, sustenance for rebels.”126 Here, Chávez shared how, even before he was pardoned
for his attempted coup almost a decade before he became president, he had devoted time to analyzing
the Cuban socialist model. He then proceeded to describe how focused he was “in organizing in
Venezuela an immense social movement: the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200,”127 which
would later on evolve into the Movement for the Fifth Republic (Movimiento Quinta República, MVR)
to support Chávez’s presidential candidacy. The connection he established between his reading in
prison and the MBR-200’s mission shows a clear ideological link.
As mentioned previously, Castro spoke at Chávez’s presidential inauguration in 1999. Aside
from the mere fact that he was present as a speaker during such an occasion, Castro’s speech itself
signaled a camaraderie between the two leaders. There, he made several references to Venezuelan
revolutionary Simón Bolívar, quoting him as having said, “‘The United States seems destined by
Providence to plague the Americas with misery in the name of liberty.’”128 This quote would then
proceed to be referenced by Chávez on several occasions, including at his speech at the Universidad
Autónoma de México (UNAM) in 2004. Afterwards, Castro also added that in the incoming Chávez
presidency, he saw “a true rebirth of Venezuela, or at least an exceptionally great opportunity for
Venezuela. [He saw] it coming not only in the interest of Venezuelans; [he] also [saw] it in the interest
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of Latin Americans. [He saw] it as something in the interest of other peoples in the world as it
advances—because there is no other choice—towards a universal globalization.”129 Chávez’s later
references of globalization for Latin America and the Caribbean130 shared with this speech a distinctive
goal for the integration of the region. Finally, Castro assured Chávez and his audience that “[their]
neighbors to the north are not at all happy with the process that is taking place here in Venezuela, and
they do not want it to succeed.”131 Castro based this premonition on personal experience of the Cuban
revolution and its relationship with the United States, indicating that the U.S. would react similarly to
Chávez as they did to Castro due to a perceived likeness.
The relationship between the leftist governments in Cuba and Venezuela became even
stronger in 2003, when, as part of his Barrio Adentro program, Cuban medics began to enter Venezuela
to provide medical assistance in exchange for oil. This new policy, however, raised concerns among
U.S. officials that Venezuela was being “Cubanized.” In response, Castro sent Chávez a
communication that June, where he said that these accusations “do not offend Cuba, on the contrary
they honor it, those who, by the use of some internationally renowned Cuban experiences, affirm that
to teach to read and write is to Cubanize Venezuelans, as it also does not offend [Cuba] those that
slander [their] selfless medics that in many parts of the world fight for health and life, presenting them
as indoctrinators.”132 He not only referenced Barrio Adentro, but also other Bolivarian projects such as
Misión Robinson, a literacy program, that had been modeled closely after their Cuban counterparts.
Chávez also mentioned this “Cubanization” in his speech at the UNAM, after saying of Cuba: “Cuba
is a brother people133, and what a brother and what solidarity that of the Cubans, and it has a President,
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and the problem of Cuba is of the Cubans, not of the North Americans, or of the Mexicans, or of the
Venezuelans. [Venezuela] must make a front in defense of the sovereignty not only of the Cuban
people, of the Mexican people, of the Venezuelan people.”134 He used his claim that the Venezuelan
and the Cuban peoples are like brothers to call for the protection of Cuban sovereignty as a priority
for Venezuela.
On December 14th, 2004, on the tenth anniversary of his first visit to Cuba, Chávez was
awarded the Order of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes by Castro. That same day, the ties between the
Cuban and Venezuelan revolutions were institutionalized through ALBA. During his speech at this
event, Castro described ALBA as “a Bolivarian conception of economic integration, and a bilateral
agreement to begin its application, that will make history.”135 Furthermore, he added that what moves
him and his Cuban colleagues the most is that Chávez returned to Cuba “to share [his] Bolivarian and
Martian136 battles with [Cuba].”137 In referencing both Simón Bolívar and José Martí, Castro took his
speech a step further than merely connecting the ongoing revolutions to each other: he drew historical
parallels between revolutionary figures, implying a similar status for himself and Chávez. Chávez made
a similar statement in his speech at the World Social Forum in June of 2005, when he mentioned that
only three years prior “[they] were only Fidel and [Chávez] alone in those meetings of presidents, it
was like a neoliberal chorus and one there felt like an infiltrated, conspiring.”138 He spoke of himself
and Castro as the two lone voices speaking out against imperialism, establishing that as their ideological
bond. While their revolutions were not identical, with Chávez having “no plans to emulate the
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particular Soviet form of the Cuban economy, or the particular form of Cuba’s political
arrangements,”139 what did unite them did so fiercely.
In August of 2005, Castro and Chávez gave subsequent speeches regarding the Bolivarian
Revolution and the construction of 21st century socialism. Castro spoke first, describing his friendship
with the Venezuelan president as one “that can exist between two endeared brothers, two truly sincere
revolutionaries.”140 He then proceeded to predict that “in a country with the enormous resources on
which Venezuela counts, the Bolivarian Revolution may reach—in half the time—75% of what Cuba,
blockaded country and with infinitely less resources than Venezuela, has been able to achieve since
the triumph of the Revolution.”141 While he did not say this explicitly, his comment clearly implied a
significant commonality between the aims of each revolution. He concluded his speech by referencing
his famous speech from 1953, saying that “if President Chávez agrees, a day like this would be the
appropriate occasion to respond: Condemn us, we do not care! History will absolve us!”142
To that, Chávez responded directly, “to be just and exact with history and with the peoples
and with Fidel, […] [he] would just add the following: You, Fidel, have already been absolved by
history.”143 The camaraderie between the two revolutionary figures reached an evident degree with
these linked comments. Chávez’s affinity for Castro’s specific ideology is also specified in this speech
on two occasions. The first was when Chávez said that “every day imperialism is more dangerous, as
Fidel says, it is the most powerful empire in history.”144 Moments later, he mentioned how his
government, “from Caracas, from Venezuela, have made the call because [they] believe it was the first
step that needed to be taken, [they] believe it was the first step because almost nobody in the world
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had dared in these past years to speak of socialism, almost, nobody; exceptions? The revolutionary
and socialist Cuba.”145 In those two comments, Chávez expressed his reverence towards the Cuban
revolution and its ideology.
This relationship did not go unnoticed by the United States. April 28th, 2006, the Country
Reports on Terrorism by the U.S. state department stated that “‘Venezuela virtually ceased its
cooperation in the global war on terror, tolerating terrorists in its territory and seeking closer relations
with Cuba and Iran, both state sponsors of terrorism.’”146 On August 18th, 2006, the U.S. Director of
National Intelligence John Negroponte announced the establishment of the position of Mission
Manager for Cuba and Venezuela. This caused heightened tensions between the United States and
Venezuela, which had been close to signing an agreement to cooperate with the DEA once again.
Additionally, in the policy report from November of 2006, it was noted that “U.S. officials have
expressed concerns about President Chávez’s plans for military arms purchases, his relations with such
countries as Cuba and Iran, and his efforts to export his brand of populism to other Latin American
countries.”147 Though the report mentioned both Cuba and Iran as points of concern in Venezuelan
foreign policy, Cuba was further specified when it added that “U.S. officials also have expressed
concerns about President Chávez’s close relationship with Cuba’s Fidel Castro, but Chávez defends
his relationship with Cuba.”148 Evidently, both the ideological similarities between the two revolutions
as well as their foreign relations between each other were poignant enough to garner attention from
the United States authorities.
Finally, if it has not yet demonstrated its strength in previous quotes, the personal friendship
between Castro and Chávez was markedly clear during the phone conversation aired on a radio
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emission of Chávez’s show, Aló, Presidente on February 27th, 2007. In a rare instance of broadcasted
communication, Castro called Chávez while the show was being transmitted that day. Chávez admitted
early on in the conversation that “that energetic [Venezuelan] revolution without Cuba would have
been impossible.”149 Further along in the conversation, Chávez referred to Castro as an “example of
resistance and now of offensive.”150 By this, he meant that not only did Castro and the Cuban
revolution endure the challenges that arose in the early stages of his government, but Castro was able
to consolidate his socialist project and help advance those of other countries as well. Included in those
other countries whose socialist projects have been helped by Fidel Castro and his revolutionary
rhetoric, evidently, is Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. In their analysis of Venezuela’s relationships
with allies against the United States, Corrales and Romero even stated a then-popular theory that “it
is doubtful that the Cuba-Venezuela alliance will falter as long as Chávez and the Castros are in
power.”151 While in previous sections the influence of U.S. policies and interventions in Latin America
and Venezuela specifically was noted in the increased hostility against the United States to be found
in Chávez’s rhetoric, his initial and continued socialist revolutionary ideals have undoubtedly been
inspired by his older Cuban counterpart.
VII. CONCLUSION
This study began with the premise that, in order to understand why the rhetoric of certain
revolutionary figures has historically taken a specific tone, their relationship with international context
is paramount. This idea is based on dependency theory, as the latter maintains that the economic
dependency of one nation upon another affects not only its specific economics, but also its
relationship with other countries in an international context, as well as to what degree the country on
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which it is dependent may influence national politics. As a result, the beginning of this study focused
on analyzing the relationships that the two peripheral countries in question—Cuba and Venezuela—
had with the United States. This, in turn, allowed for both a historical lens (in the sense that policies
from the early twentieth century were studied) and a structural lens (how more recent U.S. policies
had, and continue to have, an ongoing impact) in this analysis. As predicted, there were consequential
ties between policies enacted by the United States towards Latin America as a whole and the two
countries in general, and the way in which the leaders modified or radicalized their rhetoric, studied
through their references to the United States.
However, there are two relationships that had not been clear from the outset: the influence that Fidel
Castro’s socialist and revolutionary rhetoric was having upon the policies of the United States, as well
as its influence upon Hugo Chávez’s own ways of speaking. While it is difficult to establish causality
between the United States’ policies and Castro’s revolution in Cuba, what is evident is that the cyclical
relationship between the two lent itself both to further radicalization by Castro, as well as harsher
stances within American foreign policy against Castro and his brand of socialism. As aforementioned,
this idea is strengthened through a structural neorealist perspective, allowing for the escalation of
security concerns based on Castro’s rhetoric to lead to stricter United States policies. On the other
hand, Castro’s revolutionary ideology had a clearly defined impact upon Chávez’s own thought since
well before the latter was elected president of Venezuela. Castro’s radicalization, as a result and
combined with aforementioned U.S. policies, also saw parallels in the radicalization and anti-American
government tone of Chávez’s speech. A crucial aspect of this chain of influence is demonstrated in
the Circular Logic Pyramid in Figure 3, in which both U.S. policies towards Venezuela and Castro’s
socialism in Cuba have informed Chávez’s speech and rhetoric. It then follows that U.S. policies
towards Cuba and Castro would also have an indirect effect upon the way in which Chávez perceives
the United States.
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Figure 3: Circular Logic Pyramid

One important area of study that could benefit from further exploration is extending such an
analysis centered in historical structuralism, dependency theory, and structural neorealism, to not
merely include discourse but also employ a broader focus to include national policies and
constitutional amendments made under Castro and Chávez. Furthermore, limiting this study to
speeches and policies enacted prior to 2007 excludes analysis of Obama-era policies, which are
especially important to consider given that these international relationships may or may not have
changed once Castro and Chávez were no longer political heads of their respective countries.
Consequently, a study that expanded from the very beginning of these two leaders’ rises to power to
their end would constitute a more holistic review of shifts in both rhetoric and policies. Finally, a study
that takes into consideration grassroots organizing and other leftist and socialist organizations on a
more local national level in both Cuba and Venezuela could shine a light on whether the rhetorical
radicalization is specifically unique to Castro and Chávez, or whether this is indicative of a broader
trend among leftist leadership faced with U.S. opposition.

55

The Battle Over Venezuela: A Modern Tale
There are important policy implications of this study, especially with the ongoing humanitarian
crisis surging in Venezuela under the presidency of Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s handpicked successor.
Faced with sanctions and punishment, the leadership of the country has not only denounced it as
further proof of current U.S. imperialism, but it has also gripped more tightly onto its revolutionary
tone. According to a report for U.S. Congress, during 2017 and 2018 “President Maduro and the ANC
[Constituent National Assembly] moved to consolidate power and blamed U.S. sanctions for the
country’s economic problems.”152 Although a great part of the economic downfall of Venezuela under
the Maduro regime is attributed to mismanagement and falling prices of oil, Maduro has been able to
use the United States’ antagonization of his government as supposed evidence of economic sabotage
not unlike that against Cuba in the early Castro years. Additionally, the United States’ influence on
global institutions such as the OAS, the IMF, and the World Bank has given Maduro further
ammunition to claim of a Western conspiracy against his rule.
Not unlike the non-Communism-related concerns towards Cuba, the global community has
also expressed disagreement with how Maduro’s government handles democracy and human rights
violations in Venezuela. In August of 2017, the Lima Accord was signed “rejecting the rupture of
democracy and systemic human rights violations in Venezuela, refusing to recognize the ANC, and
criticizing the government’s refusal to accept humanitarian aid.”153 November of 2017, the European
Union created a framework for sanctions against the Venezuelan government and included material
that could aid in internal repression. Later in January of 2018, this framework would help target
sanctions against several governmental officials. After the May 2018 presidential elections in
Venezuela, which many countries considered illegitimate, “the Trump Administration has sought to
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increase pressure on the Maduro government in order to hasten a return to democracy.”154 As a result,
several measures were taken against Venezuela, including Executive Order 13808, restricting the ability
of Venezuela’s government and national oil company PDVSA to access American finance; Executive
Order 13827, preventing United States purchase of Venezuelan digital currency; and Executive Order
13850, forbidding United States purchase of Venezuelan debt.155
With the current struggle for political power over Venezuela between Maduro and National
Assembly president Juan Guaidó, the international stage has once again shone a spotlight upon the
region. Under the national constitution of the country, the absence of a legitimate president by the
inauguration date means the president of the National Assembly assumes the charge of interim
president until new elections are held. Consequently, late January 2019, Guaidó was declared interim
president of Venezuela. Some members of the international community, however, question the
legitimacy of Guaidó’s claim to power, leading to certain leaders supporting or opposing this new
government. In Alejandro Velasco’s op-ed, he describes Venezuela as “a spoil in a larger prize.”156 He,
along with many Venezuelan politics scholars, worry about the impact the United States’ role in a
government transition may have upon the prospect of a future governmental transition in the country.
It is true that a regime change might result in a more beneficial relationship between the new
Venezuelan government and the American government, as it is highly improbable that a new political
leader would view the United States with as hostile a perspective as Maduro. This certainly sheds light
on the adamant concern shown by U.S. government officials such as Mike Pompeo towards the
Venezuelan situation. However, this conceptualization of United States interventionism lacks a strong
distinction between direct intervention and the support of a legitimate regime change. In this specific
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instance, the classification of Guaidó’s interim presidency as legitimate or otherwise depends
predominantly on Venezuelan national politics, rather than a tunnel-like focus on the fact that other
countries are becoming involved.
There have also been simultaneous global efforts to aid the ongoing refugee crisis resulting
from the poor humanitarian conditions in Venezuela. With a mass exodus occurring, neighboring
countries in the region have been faced with an unprecedented influx of Venezuelan refugees. Aside
from joint international actions being taken to support this cause, “the Trump Administration has
worked bilaterally and multilaterally to increase pressure on the Maduro government while also
providing assistance to neighboring countries hosting more than 3 million Venezuelans who have fled
the country.”157 This crisis, in part, has also influenced the United States’ decision to not implement
significantly stronger restrictions upon Venezuela, for fear that conditions could worsen for
Venezuelans themselves. Additionally, as noted by the Congressional report on Venezuela,
“sanctioning additional Venezuelan officials might help to increase pressure on the Maduro
government to cede power or at least stop violating human rights, whereas others argue that increased
sanctions would only encourage Maduro and his allies to harden their positions.”158 Following the
arguments of this thesis, further sanctions might not only have a direct negative impact on the
Venezuelan population itself, but also indirectly by encouraging the antagonization by Venezuelan
officials against international interventionism—humanitarian or otherwise.
In terms of actions taken by the government and the key leaders’ ideologies, this study
demonstrates that further radicalization is the most common response in these two revolutions, which
by virtue of Maduro being Chávez’s successor has continued well past the latter’s death six years prior.
While concessions might not accomplish the goal of resolving this crisis, any sanctions must be
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carefully analyzed to ensure that the historical connotations do not lead to a perceived perpetuation
of imperialism. Additionally, direct intervention would have a strong effect in the opposite direction
as intended, as possible failure of such a mission would result in much harsher attitudes against
cooperating with the intervening government. Essentially, while measures taken by the international
community may specifically be targeting only the top heads of governments, there is still an important
way in which this could negatively impact the rhetoric, policies, and, as a result, people of those
countries. Extreme caution in ensuring that future political sanctions and actions taken against the
Maduro regime is necessary to encourage a de-escalation of the conflict, without fueling further antiAmericanism or exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela.
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF EVENTS
1901

Platt Amendment

1934

In Cuba, Fulgencio Batista ousts Grau San Martín with help from the United States.

1939

The United States sponsors a resolution recommending that it eradicate “threatening”
ideologies.

1948

The United States grants diplomatic recognition to Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez
Jiménez.

1952

Fulgencio Batista rises to power in Cuba after leading a military coup shortly before
presidential elections.

1953

July 26

Fidel Castro leads an attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. The attack
is unsuccessful, and Castro is imprisoned for a year. He then travels to Mexico, where
he forms a revolutionary group with his brother Raúl and with Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

1954

The Declaration of Caracas is decided in the Caracas Conference of the Organization of
American States (OAS), in which anticommunism is included by the United States as
part of the agenda.

1956

Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara launch a guerrilla war against Fulgencio
Batista but are unsuccessful.

1958

January 23

The Venezuelan Pacto de Punto Fijo is signed to preserve a new democratic regime after
the fall of President Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

1959

February 16

Fidel Castro rises to power in Cuba as Prime Minister.

May 17

Fidel Castro passes his Agrarian Reform Law, expropriating large holdings with
compensation.

May 21

Fidel Castro states in a televised speech that his revolution “is neither capitalist nor
communist”.

October 21

Two planes from the United States fly over Havana and leave two dead, dozens injured.

October 27

Fidel Castro leads a rally in Havana and speaks to the crowds, blaming the United States
for the aerial attacks.
Toward the end of the month, President Eisenhower approves a CIA covert program
against Cuba.

1960

December

The CIA proposes to recruit Cuban exiles in paramilitary attacks against Cuba.

March 4

An explosion occurs on French vessel La Coubre, which had been bringing Belgian arms
to Cuba.

March 5

Fidel Castro first uses the slogan “Patria o muerte” at the funeral of the La Coubre victims.
He shares his belief that the CIA was responsible for the attack.
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May 8

Cuba restores diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, previously broken under
Fulgencio Batista.

July 6

The United States suspends Cuba’s sugar quota, which is then taken up by the Soviet
Union instead.

August 6

Cuba nationalizes United States businesses such as oil refineries, sugar mills, and
electricity and phone companies.

August 28

The United States imposes a trade embargo on Cuba.

September 13

The Act of Bogotá is signed, proposing measures to increase higher socioeconomic
standards of life in Latin America.

September 20

Fidel Castro speaks at the United Nations General Assembly.

December 16

President Eisenhower reduces Cuba’s sugar quota to zero.

January

The Eisenhower Administration severed diplomatic relations between Cuba and the
U.S.

April 15

Planes with fake Cuban insignia launch bombing raids on three Cuban air fields.

April 16

Fidel Castro speaks at the funeral ceremony for the victims of the previous day.

April 17

1,500 mercenaries, trained and armed by the CIA, begin an invasion in the Bay of Pigs.
The invasion would later fail.

May 1

“First Declaration of Havana”: Fidel Castro conducts a massive May Day rally in
Havana and speaks about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

December

Fidel Castro announces that the Revolution is not just Socialist, but rather is
Communist.

January 22

The OAS decides to expel Cuba.

February 3

President Kennedy announces a complete blockade of Cuba.

February 4

“Second Declaration of Havana”: Fidel Castro speaks as part of a manifesto for the
liberation of the Americas.

1965

October 3

Fidel Castro speaks at the closing ceremony of the founding meeting for the Cuban
Communist Party.

1967

August 10

Fidel Castro gives a speech on the Latin American revolutions.

October 9

Ernesto “Che” Guevara is assassinated by Bolivian Army Rangers, under Washington’s
command.

October 6

A Cubana airlines plane explodes off the coast of Barbados. Cuban exiles and CIA
agents Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles are arrested in Venezuela and charged.

1961

1962

1976
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1979

October 12

Cuba is listed for the first time among the United States’ list of states sponsoring
terrorism.

1982
December 17

1994

1998

1999

2000

February 27

The protests known as el Caracazo take place against increased gas prices, resulting in
approximately 5,000 casualties and newly imposed curfews on cities through
militarization.

February 4

Colonel Hugo Chávez and his supporters make a coup attempt. Chávez is imprisoned
for two years before being pardoned.

October 3

The U.S. Congress approves the Cuban Democracy Act, extending the blockade against
Cuba to third countries. It aimed to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in
Cuba.

March 26

Hugo Chávez and other imprisoned military rebels are pardoned by Rafael Caldera’s
government.

December 14

Hugo Chávez speaks at the University of Havana.

July 12

Luis Posada Carriles admits to having been involved in 1997 bombings of Cuban
hotels.

December 6

Hugo Chávez is elected president. The next month, he makes his first visit to Cuba as
president.

February

Fidel Castro attends the inauguration of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.

April

Hugo Chávez launches Plan Bolívar 2000 to further civic and social development,
modeled after Castro’s project from the early 1990’s.

May 6

Hugo Chávez speaks about his intentions for his presidential term.

September 21

Hugo Chávez speaks at the United Nations General Assembly.

October 30

Cuba and Venezuela sign the convention on oil.
Hugo Chávez passes 49 laws regarding the redistribution of land and wealth, raising
concerns of concentrated economic and political power similar to Cuba.

2001
2002

The Bolivian Revolutionary Movement 200 (MBR 200) is founded by people including
Hugo Chávez.
The Washington Consensus, a series of trade liberalization policies, is recommended to
Latin American countries.

1989

1992

Fidel Castro addresses the United Nations General Assembly on behalf of the
Movement of Nonaligned Countries.

April 11

Hugo Chávez is the victim of an attempted coup.

December 2

The Venezuelan Oil Lockout begins, the most serious in a series of strikes against the
Chávez government.
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As part of Hugo Chávez’s program Barrio Adentro, Cuban medics begin entering the
country to provide medical assistance. In exchange, Venezuela would gift Cuba with
millions of dollars’ wort of oil.

2003

2004

2005

June 20

Fidel Castro speaks to Chávez about the unrest in Venezuela, as well as the accusations
that Cuba is “Cubanizing” Venezuela.

October

President Bush appoints the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) to
hasten the demise of the Cuban revolution.

November

Trade ministers from 34 countries meet to discuss the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) to reduce trade barriers among all countries in the Americas except for Cuba.

May 8

The Bush administration plans to accelerate the transition to democracy in Cuba. Fidel
Castro responds on May 14th in a public letter.

May 9

126 Colombians are captured during a raid in a Caracas farm, and are accused of
attempting to overthrow Hugo Chávez. Of the 126, 27 were found guilty the following
year, and the rest were released and deported.

May 16

Hugo Chávez makes a nationally broadcasted announcement talking about the recent
events in Venezuela.

May 27

Hugo Chávez speaks at the conference “The Human Condition and the Southern
Nations” at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).

June 21

Fidel Castro reads his “Second Epistle” to President Bush in response to CAFC.

July

The United States tightens travel restrictions to Cuba.

December 14

Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro sign the Cuba-Venezuela Agreement, solidifying the
creation of ALBA (the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas). Fidel Castro gives a
speech when granting Hugo Chávez the Order of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes.

January

Hugo Chávez signs a decree on land reform, later seen as an attack on private property.

January 30

Hugo Chávez speaks at the World Social Forum.

June 20

Hugo Chávez speaks about the ALBA.

August

Venezuela breaks ties with the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) when
the government accuses the agency of espionage.

August 13

Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez describe their vision for 21st Century Socialism.

August 22

Television Evangelist Pat Robertson comments that the United States should
“assassinate” Hugo Chávez, eliciting a reaction both from Venezuelan officials and U.S.
policymakers.

September 15

Hugo Chávez speaks at the 60th United Nations General Assembly.

September 17

Hugo Chávez speaks at the Forum on Poverty and Justice in Our Globalized World.
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2006

September 26

A U.S. immigration judge determines that Luis Posada Carriles cannot be deported back
to Venezuela due to the possibility of him being tortured.

February 2

Hugo Chávez speaks at the celebration of the seventh anniversary of the Bolivarian
Revolution.
The U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld compares Hugo Chávez to Hitler,
saying they were both legally elected and then consolidated power.
Hugo Chávez refers to President Bush as Hitler and a “madman” planning on invading
the country. He announces plans to expel a U.S. naval attaché for spying.
The U.S. expels a Venezuelan diplomat from Washington.

February 3

Fidel Castro gives a speech praising the Bolivarian Revolution as he awards Hugo
Chávez the José Martí International Award.

February 16

The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice names Venezuela as one of the United
States’ biggest problems in Latin America and shows concern regarding Venezuela’s
relationship with Cuba as “a particular danger to the region.”

April 28

The State Department releases a report in which it states that Venezuela is “seeking
closer relations with Cuba and Iran, both state sponsors of terrorism.”

July 31

Fidel Castro steps down, delegating the presidential responsibilities to his brother Raúl
Castro.

August 18

John Negroponte, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, announces the establishment
of the position of Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela.
Venezuelan officials later announce they are reconsidering signing an agreement to
cooperate with the DEA.

2007

September 20

Hugo Chávez delivers a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, condemning
the United States and President Bush.

February 27

Hugo Chávez receives a phone call from Fidel Castro while on the air of his radio show
Aló, Presidente.
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